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A STRANGE INSTANCE OF PROCEDURAL
SELF-DENIAL
NEW YoRKx's RULE IMMUNIZING FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
DOING BUSINESS IN THAT STATE FROM LEVY UPON
CHOSES

IN

ACTION

OWING BY

THEM

TO

OTHER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
R

ECENT decisions-all of them by the Appellate Division

of the First Department--exhibit a self-denial, on the
part of our courts, which is without explanation, either in
fundamental law or economic policy, and seems to be without hope of correction, except by legislation. We refer to
the cases reaffirming that a levy, under a warrant of attachment, may not be made upon an indebtedness due from a
foreign corporation, doing business in this state, to another
foreign corporation, even though service of process upon the
debtor foreign corporation may be accomplished in this
state.' The rule on the subject is an excellent example of
how a clearly-erroneous judicial view may become ingrained
in our jurisprudence, as a basic principle, if only the error
be repeated often enough, by a court of high authority.
Nor is the lesson, thus afforded, without its significance
in guiding us in the problem of defining the jurisdiction of
our appellate courts. For, since the question of what is
leviable, under a warrant of attachment, is normally raised
by a motion to vacate the levy and service of process predicated thereon, the question of what property is subject to
levy, cannot, in the absence of leave to appeal granted by the
Appellate Division-which, in none of these cases, has been
granted-be determined by the Court of Appeals, which is
the highest court of the state, since the Court of Appeals,
'Cohn v. Enterprise Distributing Corp., 214 App. Div. 238, 212 N. Y.
Supp. 37 (lst Dept. 1925); Dos Passos v. Morton, 218 App. Div. 154, 218
N. Y. Supp. 17 (lst Dept. 1926) ; Gerard Investing Co. v. National Railways
of Mexico, 243 App. Div. 294, 276 N. Y. Supp. 1002 (1st Dept. 1935), af'd, 245
App. Div. 712; leave to appeal to Court of Appeals denied, 245 App. Div.
810; motion for leave to appeal to Court of Appeals denied by Court of Appeals
on Oct. 8, 1935; not yet reported; American Dry Ice Corp. v. Delancey
Chemical Corp., 155 Misc. 661 (1935); leave to appeal to Court of Appeals
denied, 243 App. Div. 702.
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in a long line of decisions, has held that the order made on
a motion to vacate a levy or to vacate service of process, is
not a final order. 2 Thus, we have another ironic result in
so important a field, i. e., that the court created and perpetuated for the purpose of determining basic questions of law,
for the guidance of all the courts of the state, is incapable
of expressing its opinion because the intermediate courts
will not certify questions to it for determination.
In four recent cases,' the Appellate Division of the
First Department has adhered to its earlier decisions 4 that
no levy may be made, under a warrant of attachment, against
the indebtedness of a foreign corporation, doing business in
this state, owing to another foreign corporation, even though
service of process upon the debtor corporation may be made.
In all of these cases, decision is made upon the basis of supposed authority. An analysis of these alleged authorities
shows that they do not determine the question at all, and
that, to the extent that dicta therein are applicable, they are
no longer law.
The basic case on the subject is Douglass v. Phoenix
Insurance Co.., decided in 1893. There, it was held, in an
action upon a policy of insurance, issued by defendant, a
domestic corporation, that it was no defense to such corporation that, pursuant to the laws of Massachusetts-where
it was licensed to do business-an action was brought by
creditors of the plaintiff, residing in that state, under which
a levy was made against the corporation, by which its obligation to plaintiffs was subjected to the jurisdiction of the
Massachusetts courts. The Court of Appeals said that "the
right of the plaintiff to prosecute his action in the courts
'Kramer

v. Buffalo Union Furnace Co., 196 N. Y. 532, 89 N. E. 1103

(1909); Polacsek v. American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co., 215 N. Y. 619, 109 N.
E. 1090 (1915); Hill v. International Products Co., 232 N. Y. 592, 134 N. E.
585 (1922); Bernstein v. Kahn Shoe Co., 235 N. Y. 506, 139 N. E. 712
(1923) ; Berlinsky v. Berlinsky, 237 N. Y. 531, 143 N. E. 730 (1923) ; Judis v.
Martin, 244 N. Y. 605, 155 N. E. 916 (1927) ; Mitchell v. Northwestern Ohio
Savings Ass'n, 263 N. Y. 668, 189 N. E. 748 (1934).
Sutpra note 1.
'Bridges v. Wade, 113 App. Div. 350, 99 N. Y. Supp. 126 (lst Dept.
1906); Flynn v. White, 122 App. Div. 780, 107 N. Y. Supp. 860 (lst Dept.
1907); India Rubber Company v. Katz, 65 App. Div. 349, 72 N. Y. Supp. 658
(lst Dept. 1901).
'Douglass v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 138 N. Y. 209, 33 N. E. 938 (1893).
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of his own state cannot be defeated by the pendency of attachment proceedings in another jurisdiction by a creditor
there, to reach the debt owing to the plaintiff by the defendant, where the only claim of jurisdiction by the foreign
court rests upon statutory authority to seize the debt by
and through process proceedings against the agent of a corporation of this state which owes the debt, but which has an
agent in the state where the seizure was made." 6 The court
reached such conclusion because "the corporation does not
change its domicile of origin or its residence" by entering
into another state and obtaining a license to do business
there.7 In so ruling, the court thought that it was enforcing
"a fundamental rule," a "general rule," 8 in fact, was bound
by the "rules of general jurisprudence, which this state is
bound to recognize." ' "The law of a state cannot make a
debtor a resident of that state by so declaring, contrary to
the fact and the rule of general law, at least so as to bind
another jurisdiction by the declaration." '0 Thus, was it attempted to protect our residents against the garnishee process of other jurisdictions. The underlying thought was that
"the rights of the plaintiff to prosecute his action in the
courts of his own state cannot be defeated by the pendency
of attachment proceedings in another jurisdiction * * *2"11
Following this line of reasoning, in 1899 the Appellate
12
Division of the First Department, in Carr v. Corcoran,
held that an indebtedness from a non-resident to a nonresident defendant could not be the subject of a levy in an
action in this state, although "the principle has been sanctioned that the laws of a -state for the purposes of attachment proceeding may fix the situs of the debt at the domicile of the debtor," because "it is difficult to see how it could
be possible for the courts of this state to enforce an attachment of this description. The debtor being a non-resident,
and the creditor being a non-resident, there would be nothId.at
Id. at
BId. at
9
Id.at
0
7

217-218.
220.
219.
221.

11 Ibid.
1Id.at 217.

"44 App. Div. 97, 60 N. Y. Supp. 763 (1st Dept. 1899).
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ing for the court to take hold of." 1 Thus was a rule, intended to protect our resident plaintiffs, applied to deny our
own residents access to their own courts. The logic of the
rule so required. What others could not do to them, they
could not do to others.
Such decisions make it plain that these early authorities did not decide the question of policy for or against our
residents, except as our courts thought they were bound
to do so because they were required to recognize "general"
and "fundamental" rules of "general jurisprudence." There
was no thought that it was just that our residents should
be subjected to foreign attachment, and yet themselves be
unable to avail themselves of a similar remedy in their own
courts.
But these so-called "fundamental" rules of "general jurisprudence" had been misapprehended. For, in 1904, the
14
Supreme Court of the United States, in Harris v. Balk,
with a situation presented to it precisely as in Douglass v.
Phoenix Insurance Co.,' 5 ruled that there was nothing of
"fundamental" or "general jurisprudence," or in the Constitution of the United States, which prevented a state from
levying upon an indebtedness of a non-resident, due to a
non-resident defendant, in an action brought by one of its
own residents, and, indeed, held that a non-resident debtor
would be protected against double liability, when sued on
account of his obligation in another jurisdiction. The Douglass case 16 was, thus, no longer law, not even in New York.
The opinion in Harris v. Balk 17 was written by Mr. Justice
Peckham, who, of course, was familiar with our procedure
and our public policy, because he had been a member of the
Court of Appeals. He could not see how "the question of
jurisdiction * * * can properly be made to depend upon the
so-called original situs of the debt * * *. We do not see the
materiality of the expression "situs of the debt,' when used
in connection with attachment proceedings. If by situs is
"Id. at 98-99.
198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625 (1904).
Supra note 5.
"Ibid.
U Supra note 14.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 10

meant the place of the creation of the debt, that fact is immaterial. If it be meant that the obligation to pay the debt
can only be enforced at the situs thus fixed, we think it
plainly untrue. The obligation of the debtor to pay his debt
clings to and accompanies him wherever he goes * * * " 18
Therefore, the Supreme Court of the United States laid down
the rule that a debt could be levied upon in any state where
the debtor of the defendant was amenable to service of
process.
Thus, were our residents deprived of the protection given
them by our courts-for, in this respect, by reason of the
full faith and credit clause of the constitution, the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States was obligatory.
By the same standard, they should have been permitted to
do unto non-residents as non-residents could now do unto
them. But that was for our own courts to decide--for, in
this respect, the decision of the Supreme Court had no binding force. The question, then, became and is still a compelling one: Why should the State of New York, thus disabled from protecting its own residents from foreign garnishee process, nevertheless continue to so disadvantage its
own citizens and residents that, alone among all the state
sovereignties in the Union, it requires them to go elsewhere
to enforce their rights, whereas other states, following the
rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States,
permit their residents to use their attachment laws to full
effect, even as against New York residents?
The answer to this question undoubtedly lies in appreciation of the fact that a rule intended to protect New York
residents, as plaintiffs, when rendered nugatory by superior
federal decision, was nevertheless deemed to be enforceable
againstthe interest of New York residents, out of a mistaken
sense of duty to dicta of the Court of Appeals, never intended
to operate against, but in the interest of, our own residents.
For the Court of Appeals had decided only that our residents
might sue here, notwithstanding foreign attachment! Never
that our residents might not levy here upon an indebtedness
from one non-resident to another, of whom jurisdiction might
"Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 222, 25 Sup. Ct. 625 (1904).
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be obtained! Thus was the Douglass case 19 converted from
a shield into a trap, and the fact overlooked that it was no
longer law!
A brief review of the authorities will demonstrate this
fact:
As we have seen, Douglass v. Phoenix,Insurance Co.20
-decided in 1893-upon its precise facts was overruled by
Harrisv. Balk,21 decided in 1904. It certainly is not the law
today. For, obedience to the full faith and credit clause of
the constitution requires us to recognize the garnishee processes of other states, and thus refrain from imposing double
liability. So presented, the question is no longer one of policy, as to which we have choice, but of obligation, as to which
we must obey.
National Broadway Bank v. Sampson 22 was decided in
2 3 It
1903-one year before the decision in Harris v. Balk.
seems inconceivable that much of its dictum would have been
uttered, had the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Harris
case2 4 been then available. But, on its facts, it is without
any relevancy to the question under discussion. For, what
had occurred in that case, was an attachment in this state
of a debt owing by a non-resident partnership to a foreign
corporation, by service upon one of the partners, who happened to be in New York. It was asserted that, by such
service, jurisdiction was obtained of the firm. The court
held that such service, even though personal, did not bind
the non-resident members of the firm, and that, therefore,
there was no valid levy as against them. As put by the court
itself, the inquiry was: "Did the service of the warrants of
attachment upon Eugene H. Sampson, one of the partners,
constitute a levy upon or attachment of the indebtedness
owing by that firm so as to bind his copartner, who was a
non-resident, and thus make him personally liable therefor?
To charge Charles E. Sampson by virtue of such service involves the conclusion that the attachment not only created a
"Supra note 5.
O Ibid.
Supra note 14.
179 N. Y. 213, 71 N. E. 766 (1903).
z Supra note 14.
21Ibid.
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lien upon the indebtedness of Eugene H. Sampson as a member of the firm, but also created a liability therefor against
each of the non-resident members of that firm as well. We
think no such liability as against the defendant, Charles E.
Sampson, or the other non-resident members of the firm
resulted from such service of the attachment." 25
Thus, whatever was said in the National Broadway
Bank case,2 6 to the effect that any other conclusion would
"give rise to the most embarrassing conflicts of jurisdiction, would lead to great confusion and uncertainty, and
greatly prejudice the rights of creditors," 27 was correct
enough as applied to the facts in that case, i.e., involving
an attempt to bind a non-resident, through service upon a
partner within the state, but without application here. The
decision on this point would be law today, even under the
rule of Harris v. Balk.2 8 No further effect can be given to
it. The Court of Appeals, when confronted with it in Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Go.,29 distinguished it
upon the ground that the "suit was in aid of an attachment
claimed to have been levied in this state upon a debt owing
by a Massachusetts limited partnership to a Massachusetts
corporation. The warrant of attachment was not served
upon all the partners."30 If it had been, the implication is
clear that the levy would have been sustained.
This conclusion is reinforced by a careful consideration
of Plimpton v. Bigelow,'3 which is cited in all the caseseven those lately determined by the Appellate Division of
the First Department, and which we shall hereafter discuss.
It decided that shares of stock of a foreign corporation were
not subject to levy here, under Section 647 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, now Section 915 of the Civil Practice Act.
The decision was strictly limited to that proposition, for the
court said: "But whatever view may be taken as to the right
to attach a debt owing by a foreign corporation to a non' Supra note 22, at 221-222.
0 Supra note 22.

'National Broadway Bank v. Sampson, 179 N. Y. 213, 225, 71 N. E. 766

(1903).
' Supra note 14.

189 N. Y. 447, 82 N. E. 438 (1907).

'Id. at 459.

'93

N. Y. 592 (1883).
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resident by service of notice on an agent of the corporation
within the jurisdiction, we think in respect to corporate
stock, which is not a debt of the corporation in any proper
sense, it would be contrary to principle to hold that it can
be reached by such a iiotice." 32 Such is settled law. Even
in that early case---which has been so much misapprehended
in all subsequent decisions in this state-the Court of Appeals recognized that it was general practice to permit of
attachments against foreign corporation debtors doing business here. So, the Court of Appeals said:
"But in some of the States foreign corporations having an agent, or a place of business within the State
may be charged under what is called the trustee process, or a garnishee. * * * In these proceedings the
trustee or garnishee is joined with the principal defendant as a party to the action, and the debt owing by
the trustee or garnishee is ascertained, and the liability of the trustee and garnishee is adjudged in the
action. There may be no difficulty upon principle in
compelling a corporation which has an agent and
officer in another state and is transacting business
there, to respond in garnishment proceedings for the
debt, although the creditor-the principal defendant
-is a non-resident, and if bound to respond it is certainly just that the judgment which compels the corporation to pay the debt to the plaintiff, should protect it in making such payment, against a subsequent
claim by its creditor. We do not enter into this question here." 33
Indeed, the basic conception underlying recent decisions
by the Appellate Division of the First Department, is without any justification in the authorities. For there is no
proper line to be drawn between a domestic corporation
domiciled here, and a foreign corporation, which is said to
have its domicile only in the state of its origin. In Morgan
MId. at 601-602.
13Id.

at 601.
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v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 34 decided in 1907-

three years after the decision in Harris v. Balk 3 -and
the cases of Carrv. Corcoran

6

with

Douglass v. Phoeni, 3 7 Plimp-

ton. v. Bigelow 38 and National Broadway Bank v. Sampso, 3 9 as well as Harris v. Balk 40 and Louisville, etc., R. R.
Co. v. Deer,4 1 also presented to the court, in briefs of counsel,
it was held that a foreign corporation licensed to do business
here was a "resident of this state through its agent so located
and doing business here," and that as to claims such as were
made in that case, it "should be treated as a domestic

*

*

*

company and as domiciled in this state." 42
No longer was it or is it true that a foreign corporation
which does business in this state "does not change its domicile of origin or its residence." 4

On the contrary, it is now

recognized, as we have seen-even by the Court of Appeals,
which formally announced the earlier doctrine--that a foreign corporation licensed to do business here is a "resident
of this state." 14 The practical reason is that the subject
matter of the indebtedness is in "the control of our court
and any judgment that may be rendered in the action can
be enforced and made effectual in this state." 45
The rule thus stated, as applied to a foreign corporation
licensed to do business here, was not new. It had been stated
with precision in Martine v. International Life Insurance
Society.46 It was approved by the Supreme Court of the
United States in New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
T oodworth.4 7
It is not without significance that Judge
Chase, who wrote the opinion for the Court of Appeals in
"Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 189 N. Y. 447, 82 N. E.
438 (1907).
'Stpra note 14.
'Supra note 12.
"Supra note 5.
'Supra note 31.
"Supra note 22.
"Supra note 14.
"200 U. S. 176, 26 Sup. Ct. 207 (1905).
"Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 189 N. Y. 447, 454, 82 N. E.
438 (1907).
" Douglass v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 209, 220, 33 N. E. 938 (1893).
" Supra note 42, at 454.
"Ibid.
"53 N. Y. 339 (1873).
111 U. S. 138, 4 Sup. Ct. 364 (1884).
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Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.,48 in his opinion dis-

tinguished every case, statements from which are quoted in
the later opinions of the Appellate Division,4 9 on the ground
that such "statements" must be read in the light of the facts
presented in those cases, which rendered them quite different. In none of them, except the Douglass case, 50 was there
involved a foreign company licensed to do business in the
attachment state, and the Douglass case, 51 as we have seen,
is certainly no longer law, since overruled by Harris v.
2
5

Balk.

Thus was the doctrine of situs (for attachment purposes) duly interred. It was a theory conceived in error,
and, therefore, disposed of by the Court of Appeals, which
created it, at the very first opportunity given to it after the
decision in Harrisv. Balk.53 Thus was our mistaken notion
of situs, merged with the federal view of jurisdiction depend54
ing upon service of process. Indeed, in the Morgan case,
the Court of Appeals created a new formula, i. e., that, the
situs of the debt would be found where jurisdiction of the
attachment debtor could be found. And the reasoning was
the rather practical proposition that "Whenever a question
as to the situs of a similar claim against an insurance company doing business in a state pursuant to the statutes
thereof has been directly involved in this court or in the
federal courts, and it has been sought to uphold the situs of
the claim in the state where the contract was made, it has
been sustained." 55
Only recently, in Severnoe Securities Corporation v.
London d.Lancashire Insurance Company,0 the Court of
Appeals again confessed the error of its original thoughtthis time in an opinion by Judge Cardozo:
4

Supra note 29.
"Id. at 458-459.
' Supra note 5.

r'Ibid.
Supra note 14.
Ibid.
Supra note 29.
Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 189 N. Y. 447, 454, 82 N. E. 438
(1907).
- 255 N. Y. 120, 174 N. E. 299 (1931).
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"The situs of intangibles is in truth a legal fiction,
but there are times when justice or convenience requires that a legal status be ascribed to them. The
locality selected is for some purposes, the domicile of
the creditor; for others, the domicile or place of business of the debtor; the place, that is to say, where the
obligation was created or was meant to be discharged;
for others, any place where the debtor can be found.
* * * At the root of the selection is generally a common sense appraisal of the requirements of justice

and convenience in particular conditions.

*

*

* 11 57

If "at the root of the selection is generally a common
sense appraisal of the requirements of justice and convenience in particular conditions," 58 what common sense or
justice is there in denying a resident of this state access to
his own courts, under conditions certified as entirely proper
by the Supreme Court of the United States, when such access
is made available by every other state, to its own residents?
Why should a New York resident be compelled to seek justice elsewhere, when his own courts were created by him and
at his own expense, so that he might obtain justice here? As
was said by Mr. Justice Holmes (though in a dissenting
opinion upon another subject) :59 "A debt is a legal relation
between two parties, and if we think of facts, is situated at
least as much with the debtor against whom the obligation
must be enforced, as it is with the creditor. To say that a
debt has a situs with the creditor is merely- to clothe a foregone conclusion with a fiction." 60
To us, it seems that the decisive consideration of policy
is this: Whatever may be our view with respect to our residents, the fact remains that all other states permit theirs to
garnishee debts due by non-residents to other non-residents.
This, of course, includes debts due to New York residents.
It follows, therefore, that, whether we like it or not, when
our residents become subject to garnishee process elsewhere,
they have no recourse. Nothing we can do can change that
57Id. at 123-124.
Ibid.
SSafe Deposit Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59 (1929).
®Id. at 97-98.
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rule, for the Supreme Court of the United States has said
that it is right, and we must, therefore, obey, under the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution. All that is given
to our residents, in such case, is protection against double
liability, and that is all that they should have a right to
expect. But, when our residents, in turn, seek, in this state,
to prosecute a similar procedure against non-residents, then
-unless we adopt the view for which we argue-we say to
them that they must go elsewhere, and that we will not give
them benefits available to residents of every other jurisdiction-in fact, available even to our own residents in other
jurisdictions. There is neither rhyme nor reason in any such
rule of law. Instead, it presents a novel application of the
principle of self-denial, with not a bit of good that may
result to any one, except the defaulting non-resident debtor,
who would take advantage of the situation.
A rule formulated to protect our own residents, now
that our courts are powerless to enforce it for that purpose,
should not now be employed to their detriment. With respect
to foreign garnishee process, we have no choice but to obey
superior federal restraint. But with respect to our own law
of attachment, we are free to choose. Why deny our own
residents access to their own courts?
But there are further reasons which show that the supposed New York rule is without any basis whatsoever, as
applied to foreign corporations. For not only was our conception of state garnishee power changed, but, also, our
theory of local domicile of foreign corporations. Until 1913,
Section 1780 of the Code of Civil Procedure (later, Section
47-now Section 225 of the General Corporation Law), provided for only three instances in which a non-resident might
sue a foreign corporation. In substance, these were: When
the contract underlying the action was made in this state;
or when the subject matter of the action was real or tangible
personal property here; or when the cause of action arose
here. But, in 1913,61 the statute was amended to add a
fourth situation, i. e., where a foreign corporation was doing
business within the state. Here was a declaration of policy
'Laws of 1913, c. 60.
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by the Legislature of the State of New York, supreme in this
field, that, notwithstanding all that had gone before--even
what had been said by this court-foreign corporations were
to be deemed present in this state for all purposes incident
to the exercise of jurisdiction through service of process.
Yet, the decisions of the Appellate Division 6 2 -later than
Mechanics & Metals National Bank of the City of New York
v. Banque IndustrielleDe Chine 63-- completely ignored this
statement of basic policy, and harked back to dicta of the
Court of Appeals, written in a day when public policy was
different, a public policy which is now disowned, as we have
shown, even by the Court of Appeals.
It is in this connection that we must consider cases like
Bridges v. Wade 64 and Flynn v. White.65
The Bridges case was decided in 1906-therefore, prior
to the amendment of our present General Corporation Law
in 1913. The fact that defendant's debtor was doing business
here was, therefore, of no consequence. The opinion of the
Appellate Division shows a distinct reluctance to choose
between the so-called New York rule and the federal practice, but disposes of the embarrassing problem of choice by
reason of the fact that "even if we applied the rule above
stated (Harris v. Balk), the levy must be held bad in the
case at bar. That rule is that attachment will lie if the
creditor of the garnishee could himself sue." 66 Attention is
then invited to Section 1780 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and the conclusion emphasized that the "cause of action
comes not within any of said requirements, and so, as it
seems to us, under all the authorities, state and federal, this
attempted levy was bad." 67 Quite clearly, this decision
would have been different, had the amendment to our General Corporation Law, adopted in 1913, been then in force.
The Flynn case 68 was decided by the Appellate Division
of the First Department in 1907-again before the amend'Supra note 1.
'205 App. Div. 543, 199 N. Y. Supp. 817 (1st Dept. 1923).
113 App. Div. 350, 99 N. Y. Supp. 126 (1st Dept. 1906).
122 App. Div. 780, 107 N. Y. Supp. 860 (1st Dept. 1907).
',

Supra note 64, at 361.

Ibid.

"Supra note 65.
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ment to our General Corporation Law. Here, however, the
court, dissatisfied with the supposed New York rule, found
a circumstance upon which it seized to uphold the attachment, and that circumstance was that this contract between
the defendant and his debtor was made in this state, and
payments made from funds deposited here. When statements in the opinions of the Court of Appeals were urged to
the contrary, the Appellate Division said, "But we have been
many times admonished by the Court of Appeals that we are
to be bound by the decisions of that court, and that an expression of its opinion is not to be divorced from its context and
warped into an authority in another case presenting a different state of facts." 69 Thus, the court proceeded to distinguish all of the prior cases, and concluded:
"I have not found any case where the Court of Appeals has held an attachment or levy thereunder bad
where the person upon whom the levy was attempted
to be made, and who owed the debt, duty or obligation, while he had his technical domicile in an adjoining state, yet was a New York business man in every
sense of the word, was in daily attendance at his regular office for the transaction of business in New York
City, kept his money on deposit in the banks of this
city, made the contract out of which the obligation
grew in this city, which, by its terms, was payable in
this city, and the greater part of the amount payable
thereunder had actually been paid in this city, when
the plaintiffs were residents of this city and their
claim against the defendant grew out of the obtaining
for the defendants the very contract which the garnishee had partially performed, and the obligation for
the last payment thereunder was the debt attempted
to be levied on. There is presented here no question
of a temporary sojourn by a non-resident and an
attempt to levy upon a debt upon a contract created
and to be performed elsewhere.
"It seems to me, in view of the large numbers of
business men who sleep in adjoining States and, there'Id. at 783-784.
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fore, have a technical domicile there, but who, as matter of fact, spend all their business hours in the actual
transaction of business enterprises in New York City,
that citizens of this State ought not to be deprived of
the aid of the court in collecting their just debts by
holding that the mere fact of such non-residence will
prevent a levy under an attachment. Under the circumstances disclosed upon this record, it seems to me
that we should hold that the thing levied upon is
within the State and subject to our jurisdiction until
the court of last resort has squarely passed upon such
a state of facts." 7o
Again was decision of the basic question involved thus
avoided.
The observation of the Appellate Division, in the Flynn
case, 7 1 that none of the prior decisions were in point, was,
indeed, sound. So we have seen.
Indeed, Section 225 of our General Corporation Law,
in so far as it creates a distinction between residents and
non-residents, who seek remedies in our courts, was held
constitutional in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, for the
Supreme Court of the United States, because "a distinction
of privileges according to residence may be based upon natural rational considerations and has been upheld by this
court, emphasizing the difference between citizenship, and
residence. * * * There are manifest reasons for preferring
residents in access to over-crowded courts, both in convenience and in the fact that, broadly speaking, it is they
who pay for maintaining the courts concerned." 72 Ironical,
indeed, would it be, if a statute, sustained by the Supreme
Court of the United States because it reasonably discriminated in favor of residents, should be ignored in construing
other parts of our law, with the result that residents are
denied the benefits of the courts for which they pay.
The correct conclusion-inevitable if we regard true
principles of jurisdiction and comity underlying-was
SSupra note 65, at 785.
'Supra note 65.

Douglass v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co., 279 U. S.

377, 387, 49 Sup. Ct. 355, aff'g, 248 N. Y. 580, aff'g, 224 App. Div. 782 (1929).
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reached by the Appellate Division of the First Department
in Mechanics & Metals National Bank of the City of New
York v. Banque Industrielle De Chine.73 There, the court
stated the proposition as follows:
"There are rulings to the effect that a debt due from
one foreign corporation to another cannot be attached,
but in such cases as make that holding, a foreign
corporation in whose hands the debt was sought to
be attached, was not engaged in business in this state.
Where, however, a foreign corporation has a license
issued to it to do business here and maintains an
office for the regular transaction of business here, it
is deemed to be a resident of the state for certain
judicial purposes within the contemplation of law."1 7
In Shipman Coal Co. v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,," the
Appellate Division of the First Department succinctly
formulated the principles to be applied:
"* * * in the case of debts the power of control for the
purpose of attachment is to be found at the domicile
of the debtor, as in this instance, for here is where
the debt can be satisfactorily enforced and reduced to
possession by reason of the control of the courts over
the person and property of the debtor, the New York
corporation. * * * The only requirement in the attachment statutes as to the situs of the property made
subject to attachment is that it must be 'found' within
the county in which the levy is made. This strictly
construed would only apply to physical property and
is an inappropriate use of the word applied to debts
or other intangible property rights. Although the
word is used in the statute, its scope is doubtless
restricted to property over which the courts may properly exercise jurisdiction quasi in rem within consti¢ Supra note 63.
Id. at 544.
219 App. Div. 312, 219 N. Y. Supp. 628 (1st Dept), aff'd, 245 N. Y. 567,
157 N. E. 859 (1927).
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tutional limitations. Here the levy was made in New
York County on the Delaware & Hudson Company,
the judgment-debtor, which is domiciled and has its
principal office here, and, therefore, the indebtedness
was 'found' here if 'found' anywhere. That the 'situs'
of debts and other intangible property rights for purposes of attachment is at the domicile of the debtor
or person owing the duty is a doctrine which is generally recognized as an exception to the general
rule."

76

We have seen that the phrase "domicile," in attachment law,
contemplates a foreign corporation licensed to do business
here.
These principles were appreciated, without being applied, in Bridges v. Wade. 77 Application was unnecessaryin fact, could not be made-because defendant's debtor, as
the law then stood, could not be served with process in New
York. In India Rubber Company v. Katz 78 and Flyn v.
White,79 the injustice of denying access to our courts was
so apparent that an exception was created and enforced.
This exception was to the effect that jurisdiction might be
asserted to garnishee a debt owing from one non-resident to
another, if said debt emerged from the transaction of business in this state. But the exception is more apparent than
real. For, in the India Rubber case,8 0 defendant's debtor, a
foreign corporation, was doing business in this state, and,
therefore, "the debt which was the subject of the attachment
was incurred by it in the course of such business." 81 Therefore, defendant was able to sue his foreign corporation
debtor in New York, even under Section 1780 of the Code
of Civil Procedure (now Section 225 of the General Corporation Law) as it then was, since the cause of action, as
between defendant and his debtor, arose in New York. This
is so, irrespective of whether said debtor was licensed to do
111d. at 315-316.
- Supra note 64.

65 App. Div. 349, 72 N. Y. Supp. 658 (1st Dept. 1901).

" Supra note 65.
"1 Supra note 78.
1Id. at 351.
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business in New York, as to which there is no information
in the opinion. And, in Flynn v. White82 defendant was
similarly able to obtain jurisdiction of its debtor for, since
it was defendant which was a foreign corporation, and its
debtor an individual within the state, Section 1780 of the
Code of Civil Procedure offered no obstacle whatsoever. Full
realization of these principles will be found in the opinion
in Flynn v. White.8 3 The importance of these observations
lies in the fact that, notwithstanding lip observance of the
rule of "situs," in fact a levy was always sustained, whenever defendant was in a position to serve process on his
foreign corporation debtor. Now, that Section 1780 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (now Section 225 of the General
Corporation Law) has been enlarged to permit service
against a foreign corporation doing business here, no reason
appears why a debt owing by said corporation to its creditor
should not be subject to levy here. The reason of all prior
decisions requires such a rule.
But all of these principles were completely ignored in
Cohn v. Enterprise DistributingCorp.,8 4 Dos Passos v. Morton8 5 and Gerard Investing Co. v. Yational Railways of
Mexico. 6 Quite significantly, in none of these cases was
the Mechanics & Metals case 87 or the India Rubber Co.
case,8 8 cited in the opinions, nor in any of them was the fact
appreciated that the decisions of the Court of Appeals, relied
upon, announced a policy erroneously thought to be compelled by superior federal law, changed by amendment of
our General Corporation Law, and disowned by the Court
of Appeals itself, and that, in all of them, the true purport
of Plimpton v. Bigelow 8 9 was misunderstood and inconclusive dicta in other cases misconstrued.
The futility of attempting to reconcile the recent decisions of the Appellate Division of the First Department, on
this point, is recognized by Judge Patterson (United States
'Supra note 65.
"Ibid.

"Supra note 1.
Ibid.

Ibid.
Supra note 63.
note 78.
8 Supra
89
Supra note 31.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 10

District Court, Southern District of New York) in Heydemann, v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., decided
December 22, 1934. 90
Furthermore, even under the most orthodox of situs theories, is it not conceded that our attachment laws fasten upon
obligations, not merely at the domicile of the creditor, but
also at the domicile of the debtor? Was not the rule thus
stated in National Broadway Bank v. Sampson,9 ' that "the
attachment laws of our own and of other states recognize
the right of a creditor of a non-resident to attach a debt or
credit owing or due to him by a person within the jurisdiction where the attachment issues, and to this extent the
principle has been sanctioned that the laws of a state, for
the purposes of attachment proceedings, may fix the situs of
a debt at the domicile of the debtor"? 92 And is it not today
incapable of dispute that domicile, within the meaning of
attachment rules, includes the concept of a foreign corporation which is licensed to do business here? 93 The answer is
not in doubt, if the issue is simply one of "common sense
appraisal of the requirements of justice and convenience in
particular conditions." 94 Nevertheless, a change in the law
to accord to a "common sense appraisal of the requirements
of justice and convenience in particular conditions" 95 now
seems impossible, except through legislation, unless, indeed,
one of the Appellate Divisions should, in some future case,
see fit to grant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
JAY

October, 1935.

10Not officially

reported.
'Supra note 22.
9
2Id. at 223.
9 SuPra note 29.
O'Supra note 56, at 123-124.
'
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